

UNPUBLISHED

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

OLIVER MIZEL ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-4568

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CR-94-27-BO)

Submitted: January 31, 2001

Decided: February 13, 2001

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Jane J. Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Oliver M. Armstrong appeals the district court's revocation of his supervised release. In 1999, Armstrong was released from incarceration and began serving a term of supervised release imposed pursuant to his 1995 conviction for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). In 2000, Armstrong's probation officer moved to revoke Armstrong's supervised release based on criminal conduct that included driving while his license was revoked and for the threat, assault, and false imprisonment of his girlfriend, Margaret McCleave.

At the revocation hearing, the district court heard testimony that revealed the stormy and violent relationship between Armstrong and McCleave. The district court disbelieved Armstrong's version of events and sentenced him to thirty months incarceration. On appeal, Armstrong asserts the district court abused its discretion by limiting Armstrong's questioning of McCleave and hindering his efforts to show her bias.

We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion. District court judges have wide discretion to determine the relevance of offered testimony, and these determinations are not disrupted save in extraordinary circumstances. *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); *United States v. Fernandez*, 913 F.2d 148, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting *United States v. Heyward*, 729 F.2d 297, 301 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984)). We will not review the district court's findings regarding the witnesses' credibility. *United States v. Saunders*, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of Armstrong's supervised release. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED