

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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**No. 98-1824**

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TENKASI M. VISWANATHAN, Doctor,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

FAYETTEVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES; LLOYD V. HACKLEY, Doctor, the Chancellor of Fayetteville State University, in his official and individual capacity; JON YOUNG, Doctor, in his official and individual capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (CA-96-160-7-BR)

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Submitted: August 13, 1998

Decided: September 1, 1998

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Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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Tenkasi M. Viswanathan, Appellant Pro Se. Celia Grasty Jones, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's orders denying his motion for extension of time to respond to Appellees' motion for sanctions, imposing sanctions against him, and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and orders and find no reversible error. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for extension of time. See generally Strag v. Board of Trustees, Craven Community College, 55 F.3d 943, 952-53 (4th Cir. 1995). Plus, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanction entered against Appellant was factually supported by the record, the district court had jurisdiction to order sanctions, and the amount ordered was proper. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395, 405 (1990); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 513, 523 (4th Cir. 1990). Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Appellant's motion for reconsideration. See Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED