UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4302

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEMETRI ROMELL PHARR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:07-cr-00258-WO-1)

Submitted: August 20, 2026 Decided: August 24, 2026

Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Todd A. Smith, SMITH GILES PLLC, Burlington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton T. Barrett, United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In 2009, Demetri Romell Pharr pleaded guilty to manufacturing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and the district court sentenced him to 157 months' imprisonment followed by 10 years' supervised release. In 2025, Pharr admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release and the district court revoked his supervised release. Pharr now appeals the 42-month sentence imposed following that revocation. On appeal, Pharr argues that the upward-variant revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. In addition, Pharr has filed a motion to file a pro se supplemental brief.[*] We affirm.

"A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release. This [c]ourt will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable." *United States v. Patterson*, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding "whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable," *id.*, applying "the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review of original sentences" but taking "a more deferential appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences," *United States v. Padgett*, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). "[I]f a sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable," we then address "whether the sentence is plainly

[*] We deny this motion as Pharr is represented by counsel. *See United States v. Cohen*, 888 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that party represented by counsel has no right to file pro se briefs or raise additional substantive issues on appeal).

unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious." *Patterson*, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines' nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." *United States v. Coston*, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). "[A]lthough the court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed." *United States v. Slappy*, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). The district court must, at a minimum, explain the sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review, to ensure that the court "considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by [the defendant] with regard to his sentencing." *United States v. Gibbs*, 897 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). And where, as here, a court imposes a sentence above the policy statement range, the court must explain why that sentence "better serves the relevant sentencing [factors]." *Slappy*, 872 F.3d at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed." *Coston*, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing the upward-variant sentence. The district court noted Pharr committed several supervised release

violations, highlighting that Pharr was not credible, dishonest, and uncooperative with his probation officer. The district court also emphasized Pharr's involvement in using hotel points to rent rooms for drug dealers in exchange for drugs, activity similar to that for which he was previously convicted. In addition, the court noted that Pharr had received a significant downward-variant sentence for his underlying conviction, but even the 157-month term of imprisonment he served did not deter his criminal behavior. While the court considered Pharr's positive employment history and some negative drug tests, the court explained that these mitigating factors were outweighed by the need to promote deterrence and protect the public from Pharr's continued crimes. This explanation adequately shows the district court considered the parties' arguments and had an adequate basis for the chosen sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the 42-month sentence is reasonable.

We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED